The Political Economy of India's Malnutrition Puzzle by Walton, Michael
India has grown enormously in the past 25 years,
but malnutrition has improved only slowly, from
a dismally high level (Figures 1 and 2).1 The
proportion of children in India with low weight-
for-age is higher than in Ethiopia, a much poorer
and drought-prone country. This is a particularly
stark indicator of unequal development. For this
fundamental dimension of wellbeing, large
numbers of people, especially children, have
benefited little from aggregate advance.
How to reduce child malnutrition is not a
mystery. The causal determinants are well-
known, driven by interactions between food
intake, health status and provision of maternal
care. Moreover, the Indian government has been
active for decades in food policy, and has a long-
standing programme – the Integrated Child
Development Service (ICDS) – that specifically
focuses on child development. The right to such
services has been underlined in decisions of
India’s Supreme Court in recent years.2
There is a lot of micro-work on malnutrition in
India, much of it reflected in other contributions
to this IDS Bulletin. This essay asks a broader
question: how do we interpret the disjunction
between aggregate prosperity and such a
fundamental measure of wellbeing? The core
thesis is that malnutrition is not only a
dimension of current (and future) inequalities,
but is also causally related to unequal
institutional structures. These reflect a political
system in which patronage and the management
of rents play a central role. This system has been
a source of uneven growth, of distorted policy
choices and weak implementation of the state.
These all conspired against effective action to
deal with child malnutrition.
I first sketch the causal processes, then present an
interpretation, and end with some implications,
including a comparison with Mexico’s experience.
There is surprisingly little careful research on
these issues: the argument is speculative, but is
hopefully useful in framing questions.
1 Causal processes
A schematic presentation of causal processes is
given in Figure 3 (see United Nations System
2005; Gragnolati et al. 2006). Nutrition is about a
lot more than food intake; behaviours of mothers,
health and nutrition workers matter; public goods
are central, on information and drivers of public
health; and the system is both complex and thick
with complementarities. Contextual influences
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on state performance and womens’ preferences
and power are fundamental.
There are many areas in which the causal chain
breaks down. The behaviour of mothers is
typically inconsistent with recommended
practices, even for many better off and educated
mothers. Rising wealth may have modest effects
on food spending. While 80 per cent of
households have access to an Anganwadi – the
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Figure 1 Child malnutrition: India in international context
Notes Data from latest survey evidence in 2000s, matched to GDP per capita for the same year; U5, under 5.
Source World Development Indicators; malnutrition data drawn from DHS, and NFHS for India.
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Figure 2 Changes in malnutrition prevalence and growth in income per capita – late-1990s to mid-2000s
Notes Data on weight-for-age of children under five, various years from late 1990s to most recent, matched to GDP
per capita for the same years.
Source World Development Indicators.
P rcentage change in per capita P P
village centre for integrated child care services
under the ICDS – most do not use it. Some
85 per cent of rural households have access to an
improved water supply, but only one-third treat
water to make it potable. A total of 58 per cent
do not take children with diarrhoea to a medical
facility, but public rural health services are often
dismal, especially in Northern India – with low
levels of attendance of either nurses or patients!3
2 Institutions, unequal growth and distortions
in public service delivery
We would expect better aggregate conditions to
improve nutrition through two kinds of channel:
through the effects of rising household wealth on
consumption of food and private determinants of
better health; and through increased
government resources on public influences,
including provisioning of water and sanitation,
Walton The Political Economy of India’s Malnutrition Puzzle18
Figure 3 A schematic account of influences on child malnutrition
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health services and nutrition programmes. Yet,
just as the cross-country data suggest a weak link
between growth and better nutrition, the India
data suggest two disjunctions (Figure 4):
between growth in the aggregate and in
household spending per person from household
surveys; and between government spending and
private consumption on the one hand, and
changes in malnutrition on the other. The last
would look even worse if we used the late 1990s
survey as the comparison point.4
How should we interpret this? There has been no
shortage of debate on both India’s growth
acceleration and over service delivery. I suggest
the following overall interpretation. A central
element of India’s economic and social
functioning is the creation and sharing of
economic rents – rents that flow from
restrictions on competition, control over
resources, and the allocation of public and social
infrastructure across groups. These often have
economic costs – diverting the effort of
companies, groups and households into securing
rents, whether in licenses, land, provision of a
local road or reservations for jobs or college
education. But they are also highly functional to
India’s political equilibrium, underpinning the
implicit contracts between the state and the
large-scale business sector and between the state
and social groups.
The first implicit contract, with the corporate
sector, can be thought of as the exchange of state
support, in the form of a credible investment
environment and specific provisioning of
permissions and infrastructure, in return for
private investment, political finance and
(sometimes) corrupt payments. But didn’t the
economic reforms change all this? They did
involve significant changes, but not to a rent-free
nirvana. There was a shift to a ‘pro-business’
stance, essential to high levels of corporate
investment.5 And there were substantial
reductions in many of the rents of the License
Raj, through de-licensing and trade opening.
These measures helped spur business growth.
Firms enjoyed Schumpeterian rents from the
discovery of new profitable activities. However,
widespread domains of state-controlled rents
remain, in land, natural resource access,
infrastructure, the allocation of the spectrum
and so on, and the implicit state-business
contract remains important.
By contrast, the implicit contract between the
state and social groups has remained one of state
patronage for political loyalty – clientelistic at
local levels, populist at state and national levels.
Aspirations for the state to become a
transformative agent for equality opportunity
ran up against pervasive inequalities (Mehta
2003). The state has become embedded in
societal functioning, and effort levels within the
state are driven more by rent-preservation than
service provision. This is the primary source of
the dismal performance of the state in many
areas of basic service delivery, as documented for
education (PROBE 1999), health (Banerjee et al.
2004) and irrigation (Wade 1985). Thus Chandra
(2004) characterises India as a ‘patronage
democracy’, in which private and club goods are
allocated by politicians and the executive to
particular groups, with ethnic affiliation tending
to reinforce this patronage structure.6 There is
widespread discontent over the performance of
the state. But the collective action problem
around effecting reform of the state is immense
and most groups choose to play within the
existing patronage-based system.
There is a spatial dimension to the implicit
contracts. At the state level, Tamil Nadu, for
example, has relatively good performance but
not because it is free of rents, corruption and
patronage, but rather because it has developed a
more successful structuring of the implicit
contracts, with greater state capacity, more
credibility with business, and more responsive
service delivery. Bihar’s political equilibrium has
been more pernicious with respect to both state-
business and state-society relations (although it
may now be in transition).
This account is directly related to the two
disjunctions. First, it forms part of the story on
unequal growth dynamics – and in particular of
the large difference between growth in rural
household spending and national income.7 The
partially reformed business sector took off,
leading to growth accelerations in the 1980s and
2000s. There has been business dynamism, high
corporate profits, and an extraordinary surge in
corporate fortunes, at least until the fall in the
stock market. But major parts of the economy
have experienced much slower growth. Of
particular importance has been weak rural
development, with the rural economy caught in a
political equilibrium in which a range of
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subsidies – for electricity, water and fertilizer –
lie at the centre of the political deal. A major
expenditure item in the 2008/09 fiscal year was
the write-off of agricultural loans. This helped
reduce short-run distress, but it served to put
back the agenda of financial inclusion that is
important to long-run rural growth. Potentially
growth-inducing action on infrastructure, policy
change or innovation in agriculture has actually
declined (World Bank 2005).
There has also been unequal spatial
development, with initially better-off and more
effective states, such as Tamil Nadu and Gujarat,
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Figure 5 Malnutrition and Net Domestic Product across Indian States, 2005/06
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Madhya Pradesh 
Uttar Pradesh 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Tamil Nadu 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 
Net state domestic product per capita (constant 1999-2000 prices) 
W
ei
gh
t-f
or
-a
ge
 (c
hi
ld
re
n 
un
de
r 5
, p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
be
lo
w
 -2
S
D
)
Source Central Statistical Organisation and IIPS (2007).
Figure 6 ICDS spending per child and proportion of underweight children under five, 2005–6
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benefiting more from business expansion than
poorer and institutionally weaker ones, such as
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh
(Figure 5). While the latter are all high
malnutrition states, the relationship with
incomes varies: Tamil Nadu has relatively low
malnutrition but not Gujarat, and initial analysis
suggests there may be no statistical relationship
with state incomes or growth!8
The second reason is that state-society relations
are a source of failure in government action.
There has been a long tradition of food
programmes in India. The largest is the Public
Distribution System (PDS) of subsidised foods
channeled through special stores – this ran at
some 5 per cent of total spending in the early
2000s. This has long been recognised by analysts
as an ineffective programme, with substantial
leakage, and little impact either on reducing
expenditure poverty or malnutrition. The ICDS,
in principle more closely aligned with the needs
of young children, has extensive reach but
limited effectiveness. It is also regressive across
states with poorer Northern states having lower
spending per person (Gragnolati et al. 2006).
There is, however, substantial variation, and the
FOCUS report (2006) found much greater
effectiveness in Tamil Nadu than in other states
reviewed.
The central institutional problem around public
action to tackle malnutrition is that this action is
badly aligned with political and administrative
incentives. This is where the causal processes
come in from Figure 3: a complex mix of public
goods in health and nutrition, requiring local
interaction between household knowledge,
behaviours and action by state agents. For
politicians or local officials this is unattractive as
a source of patronage in terms of services, for
which credible promises of repeatable private or
club goods are better, and it likely to be a poor
source of corrupt gains. The regressive state-
wide distribution of ICDS (Figure 6) may also be
associated with this interpretation, to the extent
that the mix of patronage based processes and a
weak state are more extreme in poorer Northern
States.
A particular area of tension, that bridges the
corporate and social worlds, concerns the use of
fortification. A big part of India’s malnutrition
problem concerns micronutrient deficiency, with
anemia a dramatic manifestation. Fortification
of staple foods could have a large impact and
have been effective elsewhere, in Morocco for
instance. But government contracts in this type
of area are a classic area for favoured allocation
to corrupt producers.
3 Implications
I have argued that the core of India’s malnutrition
puzzle lies in institutional functioning. What does
this mean for public action? Given the nature of
the problem, India’s public resources, and
examples of relative success within India (say in
Tamil Nadu) public action has the potential to be
effective. However, if the thesis is correct,
effecting change will be primarily about
transformation of institutional structures and
processes rather than specific techniques.
Consider two kinds of institutional change. First,
there could be deep systemic change in the
functioning of democracy, markets and the
workings of the state. Imagine a situation in
which politicians have an interest in delivering
public goods and state actors have incentives to
take action based on results and to solving inter-
agency organisational problems based on
experience of what does and does not work.
Malnutrition of rural kids would become
recognised as one of the most important
dimensions of inequality of opportunity for much
of the population, information on the extent and
depth of child malnourishment would be regularly,
publicly available and discussed in the press, and
households and communities would become aware
of the issues, changing their own practices and
pressing demands on the state for decent services.
A parallel story could be told around the
institutional basis for more equal growth
dynamics. This is a useful vision and benchmark,
but sounds unrealistic in an Indian context.
A second kind of change can be thought of as
transformational but local institutional shifts in
processes and incentives in the absence of
systemic change. This is both easier and harder –
it does not require fundamental change, but the
absence of systemic change can undercut specific
reform. A successful example from another
country illustrates: the ‘Progresa-Oportunidades’
programme of Mexico.
The Progresa programme was introduced in
poor, rural parts of Mexico in 1997, with a focus
IDS Bulletin Volume 40  Number 4  July 2009 21
on supporting the human development of poor
children.9 It is internationally famous as an early
example of ‘conditional cash transfer (CCT)’
programmes that make cash transfers to
households conditional on specific behaviours,
often related to human capital development of
children, in this case through regular attendance
at health clinics and attendance at schools.
Technical design aspects of CCTs are of great
importance, but are not the focus here that is on
the institutional challenge.10
In the 1990s, Mexico had the following
characteristics, displaying clear parallels with
India:
z a history of social exclusion, especially of
rural, indigenous groups, in spite of a national
ideology of inclusion
z a patronage-based local political system, in
which rural communities depended on local
bosses for (inadequate) delivery of favours,
alongside major neglect of local public goods
z large-scale food programmes, with substantial
fiscal subsidies, especially on maize (the
staple) and milk, ostensibly aimed at assuring
access to basic food for the poor and middle
groups, in practice highly ineffective at
tackling malnutrition, and sustained both by
rents of suppliers and populist politics
z social programmes deeply embedded in
national and local systems of patronage,
notably a high profile local public works
programme (Pronasol), that was part of the
then President Salinas’ strategy to sustain and
restructure political support for his overall
project of modernisation and political control.
Then there was a political opening, owing to the
combination of a political crisis around the
corruption and patronage of the Salinas
administration and the 1995 currency and
banking crisis. This opening was used to design
and introduce Progresa, while the major general
food subsidy programmes were phased out as
part of the fiscal retrenchment. Key institutional
design choices were:
1 a centrally managed, two-stage targeting
involving geographic selection and a proxy
means test based on household assets
2 for those selected, a right to receive the
transfer, conditional on attendance at health
clinics and schools, with centralised
management of payments
3 use of existing local public health clinics and
schools for service delivery
4 the avoidance of local, or community-based
decision-making in beneficiary selection and
design choices, to minimise risk of local
political capture, but full transparency with
communities on implementation
5 extensive information campaigns.
The programme was highly successful in many
domains, including in health and malnutrition
with, for example, a 25 per cent decline in
morbidity rates of young children in the
programme relative to those outside, and a 17
per cent gain in weight-for-age for malnourished
rural children aged 5–23 months.
Should India introduce a ‘Progresa-
Oportunidades’ style programme? Not
necessarily. Mexico had three features that were
propitious for the selected design: the political
opening; an effective federal cadre of workers to
manage core aspects of the programme; and
‘good enough’ (including reasonably non-
corrupt) local health and education services that
could be activated. There are questions in India
over each of these. But the lesson is different:
that substantial institutional change can
sometimes occur in the absence of fundamental
systemic change, when this is aligned with
institutional possibilities and constraints.
While India has tougher institutional problems
than Mexico in some areas, it also has strengths:
a vigorous national and local democracy,
technical awareness among specialists inside and
outside the state, and a growing culture of rights
and accountability, evidenced, for example, in
the Right to Information act, the design of the
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Programme and the Right-to-Food campaign.11
The part of the Right-to-Food campaign that
focuses on young children is of particular
interest: this advocates universalisation of
comprehensive nutrition, health and pre-school
services to children under six as a basic right,
complementary action through social
mobilisation and judicial and other
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accountability processes within the state, and
increased support for, and empowerment of,
frontline workers (see www.righttofoodindia.org;
Drèze 2006). From a political viewpoint this may
offer the best hope for transformational change
in the Indian context, in the absence of system-
wide reform. Alternatives, including a more
‘cost-effective’ route of focusing government
action on poor children, are less likely to work to
the extent that they are less effective in the
nexus between social awareness, mobilisation
and activating existing accountability structures
in the state.
The Right-to-Food approach need not only be
about making anganwadis work better: there is
scope for experiments with food fortification
(Drèze 2006; Gopaldas 2006), for top-down
information campaigns on care practices, and a
centralised role in measuring and publicising
results. The relative success of Tamil Nadu is a
valuable benchmark, but publicising results
within and between districts could be more
politically salient. The success of a Brazilian
programme that faced comparable challenges –
the introduction of village health workers within
a deeply clientelistic and unequal Brazilian state
– depended greatly on empowering local workers,
linking them with local communities, and
intensive radio campaigns on outcomes (Tendler
1997). Local mayors started to demand the
programme!
We will now return to the big picture. Child
malnutrition is extraordinarily severe in India.
Growing private and public resources appear to
have had little impact on the problem. This essay
has suggested that an important part of the
puzzle lies in political and social institutional
functioning, that has led to uneven growth,
under-provisioning of nutrition-related public
goods, and weak functioning of the state. Can big
changes occur in the short term? We do not
know. But the kinds of experiments in change
that would be desirable should pay as much
attention to institutional designs, adapted to
local political and social conditions, as to
technical issues.
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Notes
* Thanks to Anusha Nath for excellent research
assistance, and to Lawrence Haddad, Rinku
Murgai, John Newman and Meera Shekar for
comments and discussions.
1 There are discrepancies in the pattern of
trends between the NFHS and the other main
source – the National Nutrition Monitoring
Survey – that exclude the northern states
where malnutrition is worse (see Deaton and
Drèze 2008, for discussion). Probably all that
can be said is that there is no consistent
evidence of significant gains since the late-
1990s.
2 See the report of the subcommittee on the
working group on food and nutrition security
for the Planning Commission (2006).
3 All data from IIPS (2007); for health in rural
Rajasthan, see Banerjee et al. (2004).
4 Deaton and Drèze (2008), explore a further
issue, of falling spending on calories at given
overall household spending – that may explain
part of the second disjunction. If correct, this
makes more effective public action more, not
less, important.
5 See Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) and
Kohli (2006).
6 See also Rudolph and Rudolph (2008) for
general discussions on the declining autonomy
of the Indian state.
7 There is debate over measurement (see
Deaton and Kozel 2005), but I believe there is
a strong presumption that a substantial part of
the discrepancy between, say, growth in private
consumption from the national accounts and
household surveys is due to rising inequality;
see Walton (2008) for discussion.
8 A simple OLS regression of inter-state
differences in malnutrition India finds no
effect of either levels or changes in state
domestic product, once female literacy and
women’s body mass index is included. But this
may mean little, since there are big problems
of identification in so simple an analysis.
9 The programme was initially known as
Progresa (the Spanish acronym for its full
name). It changed its name to Oportunidades
(‘opportunities’) with the change in
administration in 2000; the focus here is on
the initial design phase.
10 For a general account of Progresa-
Oportunidades by the principal architect of
the programme, see Levy (2006); cited results
are from there.
11 www.righttofoodindia.org (accessed 14 May
2009).
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